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Introduction 
 
In the present paper we intend to rethink the “Jewish question”, in the context of 
religion’s secularization and the modern nation-state crisis, in Hannah Arendt’s political 
thought, when “dark times” are intensified (to use a concept of the author herself). Within 
this context, Hannah Arendt goes through a “philosophical shock” when she comes across 
with Karl Jasper and Martin Heidegger’s philosophies; and a “reality shock”, stemming 
from the impact of Nazism’s rise to power. We hereby want to recapture these three core 
ideas from Arendt’s political theory, which structure her living thought and are intertwined 
in this paper. For she lives within the modern context of secularization which, as we will 
see later, throws us, on the one hand, in the depths of a politics devoid of absolute 
guarantors. She writes, on the other hand, in and over the decline of modern nation-states 
that expel and denationalize both foreign citizens and their own depending on the case. She 
also thinks as a Jew from birth who suffers persecutions and particularly theorizes on her 
Jew condition and the future of Judaism before and after the creation of no other than the 
State of Israel during the British mandate held in Palestine. As we will see during this 
paper, we can identify these three issues all together, for instance, in Zionism: modern 
secularization, decline of the nation-state and the “Jewish question”. And it is from these 
intertwined elements that we can draw a critical thinking for a politics of pluralism. 
 
Secularization as context 
 
As any other contemporary thinker, Hanna Arendt’s writing context is the one of the 
secularization of religion and –according to herself– the nation-state crisis. Nonetheless, it 
is the stance in relation to this historical reality what changes depending on the case. In 
Modern theory, we can find various viewpoints on the stance to take regarding 
secularization, and this standpoint also implies a particular perspective on progress, which, 
at the same time, will have an effect on the “Jewish Question” in a different way. 
Secularization involves the downfall of sacred truths provided by the theological-
political framework; and for that reason, along with modernity comes “nostalgia for the 
absolute”, in the words of George Steiner1, embodied in modern society’s totalitarian 
forms. Hannah Arendt states along the same line: “I am perfectly sure that this whole 
totalitarian catastrophe would not have taken place if people had continued to believe in 
God, or rather in hell –that is, if there were still ultimates. There were no ultimates”.2 
Analyzing this passage, in this respect, Claudia Hilb states that “the loss of ultimates, I dare 
to say, is the interstice through which the biggest harm of our century has been inserted”.3 
Totalitarianism is a potential scenario of this resurgence of the absolute within a context of 
dispersal, but not the only possible destiny of  this modernity “out of joint”. 
Hilb states in this line that “the fall of ultimates, distinctive of Modern era’s 
secularization, has not only opened the door for the advent of the worst evils, but has also 
provided, in Arendt’s eyes, the opportunity to, eventually, regain and rediscover the 
experience of the true political origin of political order, of the political foundation 
expressed in free action, that is to say, of a lost experience under the empire of tradition that 
put order’s legitimacy on a supernatural sphere. It is in this sense that the fall of the 
theological-political supremacy not only enables the rise of modern totalitarianism, but 
also, the possibility of reunion with the miraculous institution of politics in an autonomous 
way (but not for this self-sufficient). Arendt stands before this as a modern theorist, but also 
against the flow of a certain fairly secularized thinking, which lingers on the logics of the 
linear history inheritor of the theological-political. Both Marxism and liberalism insist on 
viewing history as a linear progress. Unlike Arendt’s view, Marxism and liberalism 
prioritize progress above all else. 																																																								
1 Steiner George, Nostalgia del absoluto, trad.  María Tabuyo and Agustín López, Siruela, Madrid, 
2011, p. 13.  
2 Arendt Hannah, “On Hannah Arendt”, in: Melvyn Hill (ed.), The recovery of the public world, St. 
Martin’sPress, New York, 1979, pp. 313-314. I owe this passage to Claudia Hilb’s text quoted 
below. 
3 Hilb Claudia, “Tres miradas sobre el abismo de la modernidad: Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, 
Claude Lefort”, in: Gambarotta Emiliano, Borovinsky Tomas, Plot Martín (ed.). Estética, política, 
dialéctica. El debate contemporáneo,  Prometeo, Buenos Aires, p. 8. 
In certain crystallized approaches, for instance, Liberalism and Marxism share the same 
viewpoint on the question of history as a progress to an inexorable political goal. In this 
sense, Hegel not only represents a paramount thinker of modern philosophy, but also an 
author that took this logic, with all that it entails, to paroxysm. Hegel, thinker of endings, 
would embody that modern philosophy taken to be “a secularized form of Christianity”4 in 
the words of Leo Strauss. 
Hegel is a thinker of endings who asserts that it is only at the end of the road that we can 
tell the truth. Where does this final analysis on history as progress comes from, this linear 
history aiming towards a definite goal? As Karl Löwith explained, such analysis of the 
Western universal history as philosophy of history is a “specifically biblical”5 
representation, as well as a theoretical justification of bourgeois’ rise to power in the 19th 
century, where history was heading towards “an ultimate end, and is conducted by the 
providence of a divine will”.6 A divine will in secularization process, but 
characterized by its theological-political origin. 
Upon the theological-political logic secularized in Marxism and Liberalism, Arendt sets 
up a thought of action and natality7 against the automatism of modern society’s progress. 
For Arendt plurality is the condition of human action. There is a certain “realism” of the 
Ancients which contrasts the modern utopias that seek to create political regimes. As 
“everything generated is corruptible, this constitution will not last forever, but will be 
dissolved”,8 for the Ancients there cannot be a definite perfect world, as liberals, Marxists 
and neo-conservatives do believe.9 From the “Ancients perspective”, unlike modernists 
(Hegel), no political regime lasts forever. That is why the dispute between ancients and 
moderns –a theological-political and temporal one– is paramount for the understanding of 
how a dispute is carried out, where the Modern’s will of completion is at stake: this is a 
deeply rooted Judeo-Christian trait. In the end, as Strauss states: “The quarrel between the 
Ancients and the Moderns seems to us to be more fundamental than either the quarrel 																																																								
4 Strauss Leo, On Tyranny, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000, p. 207. 
5 Löwith Karl, Historia del mundo y salvación, trad. Norberto Espinoza, Editorial Katz, Buenos 
Aires, 2007, p.74. 
6 Ibidem. 
7 Arendt Hannah, The Human Condition, The Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1998, p. 9. 
8 Platón, República, 546 a. 
9 Gray John, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
London, 2007, p. 107. 
between Plato and Aristotle or that between Kant and Hegel.10 That is why Arendt becomes 
crucial for contemporary thinking: she does not entirely fit in either side of the dispute, 
neither in favor of a modern secularized political messianism nor of a conservatism of the 
ancients. 
In the face of these disputes between ancients and modernists, a middle-ground stand is 
taken by Arendt. Neither Marxist nor liberal, she criticizes progress at any cost without 
holding an anti-modernist position. She looks for inspiration in the origins of Greek 
politics, but does not share the same viewpoints, for instance, of Leo Strauss. She won’t 
share either his perspective on Judaism, and will take a political stance which is far from 
the one taken by revolutionary thinker Jacob Taubes’ (to mention two opposite cases). 
Despite being a modern and secular thinker, Arendt’s source of inspiration was ancient 
(thus agreeing with Strauss): she knows that the price for having an eternally fair society is 
as high as impossible is to achieve such utopia.  
 
Satethood Crisis  
 
The Enlightenment itself emancipates the Jews from the chains of the ghetto. For that 
same reason, Marcelo Raffin recalls that in an earlier text, Arendt points out that the 
modern version of the Jewish question came from a non-Jewish sphere: the European 
Enlightenment.11 Paradoxically or logically, this emancipation, however, resulted in 
Nazism. But the truth is that Arendt will survive extermination and persecution and will 
come to the cosmopolitan –though not free from ethnic problems– United States of 
America. 
The fall of the great empires after the 1914 war, reconfigured, once again, the frontiers; 
and the appearance of new nation-states brought about a huge crisis and new challenges in 
places like Europe, Africa, the Middle and Far East. Thousands of refugees, displaced and 
stateless people woke up one day in a new country, in which they had now become a 
minority. We went from the archaic plurality of multinational empires to modern states, 																																																								
10 Strauss Leo, Estudios de filosofía política platónica, trad. Amelia Aguado, Amorrortu, Buenos 
Aires, 2008, p. 238. 
11 Raffin Marcelo, “Hannah Arendt, la condición judía y la asunción del mundo”, in: Sucasas 
Alberto and Taub Emmanuel, Pensamiento judío contemporáneo, Prometeo, Buenos Aires, 2015, p. 
343. 
free from imperial ties, but potentially dangerous for the “new minorities”. All of this, 
naturally, without neither omitting nor idealizing those feudal empires which, in many 
cases, continued to persecute and harass their respective minorities. But this new scenario 
that surfaces after the empires’ fall is a double-edged scenario (later, we will see Arendt’s 
fundamental implication on this problem when addressing the Palestinian conflict). 
Stateless people and refugees at risk are seen across the globe. In the first half of the 20th 
century, within the previously mentioned context, even prior to WWII, different 
mechanisms of population and people denationalization were spread. The word in Italy in 
the 1920s was “Unworthy citizens of citizenship”, with echoes of Nazi “Lives unworthy of 
life”. 
In 1943, Arendt had already mentioned in a Classic text that refugees of a country 
represent the avant-garde of their people.12 Despite all provocation, the importance of this 
idea lies in the fact that the refugee embodies the nation-state crisis, brings up the need to 
rethink the boundaries of human rights and represents the “general corrosion of traditional 
political categories”.13  
The problem of universality in human rights –revolutionary France was the great 
promoter– is brought about by this crisis, which triggers the unsettling relation between 
State and nation-state’s own origin (let’s not forget the importance of Arendt’s concept of 
‘natality’). As Agamben stated, reviewing Arendt once more, “Nation-state means: a state 
that makes nativity or birth, the foundation of its own sovereignty”.14 France will be, in 
turn, Arendt’s nation-state model and for her, who was used to seeing history from 
Germany, the fall of France was considered a major tragedy, because she knew what this 
fall entailed (all of this took place before the discovery of the cosmopolitan American 
democracy). 
France was la nation par excellence and Arendt reclaimed an idea of non-ethnical civic 
nation, and vindicated the jus soli against the jus sanguinis. While the former donates 
citizenship through territory, the latter does so through a combination of ethos and demos. 
Giorgio Agamben recovers Hannah Arendt’s developments for a demanding present, 
because the theoretical-political sphere in question –as mentioned by Seyla Benhabib– 																																																								
12 Arendt Hannah, “We refugees”, The Jewish Writings, Schocken, New York, 2007, p. 264. 
13 Agamben Giorgio, Mezzi senza fine, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2005, p. 20. 
14 Ibidem, p. 24. 
(both the Italian philosopher and the thinker from Istanbul write their works rethinking 
Arendt regarding the underlying Yugoslavian conflict), was more than explicit by 
remarking that “the phenomenon of political evil and the lack of membership of a State will 
continue to be the most discouraging problem of the 21st century”.15  
The nation-state crisis is reflected upon Arendt’s criticism to it. According to her, 
concepts such as equality, freedom and civil independence, in favor of others as people and 
territory, should have never been left aside by the nation-state.16. Stateless peoples are 
subject to an apolitical life; their potential to exist politically is taken away from them. And 
when the nation-states become purely administrative and economic, when the core of 
statehood is the people-territory relationship, it is only natural that minorities outside this 
relationship are at risk. In the long run, the whole population might be out, due to the 
depoliticization involved in the administration of the future nation-state and the anti-
political nature of Totalitarianism. 
The nation-state went from trying to be a guarantor and instrument of the law and 
guarantees in defense of men, to being an instrument of discretion and massive 
denationalization. The Jewish people experience was extremely paradigmatic because –not 
in solitude– Jews went through this process in the heart of Europeone end to  the other:from 
the Enlightenment emancipation to modern Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination.  
But the Palestinian question will also influence Arendt’s thinking before and after 1948, 
before and after the horrific European experience and the nation-state crisis. In the eyes of 
Arendt, the European collapse serves as a true lesson to consider the world in general and 
the Middle-East in particular. If Arendt describes the consequences of the nation-state 
decline and its consequences on men’s lives in The Origins of Totalitarianism17, she also 
expands the potential consequences of this logic when writing –even before publishing this 
book– about the repositioning of Zionist Revisionism, believing there might be an Israeli 
solution involving Arab expulsion. In the long run, there is war, Arendt says. 
 																																																								
15Arendt Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt, New York, 2003 p. 134. Also see 
Benhabib Seyla, Los derechos de los otros, trad. Gabriel Zadunaisky, Gedisa, Madrid, 2005, p. 46. 
16 Sánchaez Madrid Nuria, “Crisis del Estado-nación y dialéctica de los derechos humanos en 
Hannah Arendt. El totalitarismo como colapso de las formas políticas”, ISEGORÍA. Revista de 
Filosofía Moral y Política N 49, 2013, p. 496.  
17Arendt Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 267. 
“The Jewish Question” and the debate around the State of Israel 
 
Hannah Arendt’s relation to her Jewish identity went through various stages along her 
life, and was marked by the crucial historical experiences she lived.18 Her book on Rahel 
Varnhagen narrates “the failed Jewish assimilation to a surrounding that excludes them as 
Jews”.19 And that would be Arendt’s own story in Germany. At the beginning, Arendt kept 
her distance, and was even hostile for the hesitant nature of Varnhagen’s relation to her 
Judaism and integration, and for wanting to give up on her Jewish condition. However, 
Arendt stands on her side when she recognizes herself in Varnhagen as a pariah, who 
decides to be Jewish due to people’s rejection. That is how Arendt comes to terms with her 
Jewishness as a political question: because “if you are attacked as a Jew, then you should 
defend yourself as one.”  
Then we should wonder where Judaism stands regarding politics and what political 
implication doesthe “Jewish question” have. As noted below, Arendt’s position on the 
“Jewish question” is neither unique nor the most representative (it may be unfair to say that 
somebody else is). For instance, we have Jacob Taubes with his revolutionary approach, 
then Leo Strauss’ “conservative” perspective and, naturally, Gershom Scholem’s approach 
(just to mention a scholar related to them and with Hannah Arendt); all of them, interesting 
standpoints to contrastthe theoretical-political one in question. These are essential but not 
exhaustive approaches to analyze the Jewish question, secularization and the State of Israel.   
Regarding the theological-political grounds of exile and its relation to redemption, let us 
recall Jacob Taubes’ words on the Jewish exile and its consequences: “Exile is the 
wilderness state of the nations, in which Israel wanders till the end of its days. In fact, exile 
repeats the wilderness state because life in exile is only possible through the hope of 
redemption”, and then Taubes added, “in exile, the invisible God of the wilderness becomes 
the God of the world who directs world history”.20 
																																																								
18Young-Bruehl Elisabeth, Hannah Arendt. For love of the World, Yale University Press, Yale, 
2004, p. 77. 
19Brunkhorst Hauke, El legado de Hannah Arendt, trad. Manuel Abella and José Luis López de 
Lizaga, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid, 2006. 44. 
20 Taubes Jacob, Escatología occidental, trad. Carola Pivetta, Miño y Dávila, Buenos Aires, 2010, 
p. 21. 
Taubes will also state that “The historical place of revolutionary apocalypticism is 
Israel”21, which sparks a debate on what we talk about when ‘revolutionary’ comes to 
mind; it can be regarded as the break with a present marked by suffering and injustice 
(comprehensive justice is only attainable in the end, after the break, maybe when the law is 
established). For that reason, Taubes will later affirm that “we do what is right if we are 
aware of the Christian basis where our burgoise society lies”22. The revolutionary paradigm 
is another key difference between Taubes and Arendt.  On the one hand, through an 
eschatological politics of religious messianic nature, Taubes proposes to dethrone the 
existing order all at once; on the other hand, Arendt presents herself as an admirer of the 
American Revolution23 and a critic of violence.24 
In line with all the above mentioned, Leo Strauss will reclaim the relation among 
modern conservatism, ancient liberalism and Judaism in the face of the advance of the 
universal State, proclaimed by his friend/opponent Alexandre Kojève,25 who levels and 
equals it all. Hannah Arendt took Kojève’s courses in Paris and was also drawn to dive into 
the dispute about universal or World State. The World State is considered unachievable for 
Strauss, facing the impossibility of satisfying every man’s wishes and suppressing politics; 
according to Arendt, this Marxist utopian notion (as well as liberal) of a world with no 
State and politics is more of a nightmare than a dream.26 Therefore, when tackling the 
Jewish problem, Arendt becomes interested in the question of modern liberalism. Strauss, 
despite the distance, wonders about the problems that Arendt rethinks, “Is liberalism, 
necessarily, friendly for Jews and Judaism?” And further on: “Can the liberal state claim to 
have solved the Jewish problem? Can any state claim to have solved it?”27 The background 
here and one of the main texts on this topic in this same book constitutes Spinoza’s field:  
the first Jewish thinker who stopped being one without converting to another religion. 
																																																								
21 Ibidem.  
22 Taubes Jacob, Del culto a la cultura, trad. Silvia Villegas, Katz, Buenos Aires, 2007, p. 98. 
23 Arendt Hannah, On Revolution, Penguin, New York, 2006, p. 207. 
24 Cf. Arendt Hannah, On Violence, Harcourt, Orlando, 1970. 
25 Kojève Alexandre, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, Gallimard, Paris, 2005. And see Kojève 
Alexandre, “Tyranny and Wisdom”, in: Strauss Leo, On Tyranny, op. cit., p. 170. 
26 Arendt Hannah, The Promise of Politics, Schocken, New York, 2005, p. 153. 
27Strauss Leo, Liberalismo antiguo y moderno, trad. Leonel Livchits, Katz, Buenos Aires, 2007, p. 
12. 
Spinoza is a modern liberal thinker who contributed to weakening the Leviathan State, from 
Carl Schmitt’s viewpoint,28 paralyzing Europe and emancipating Jews all at once.  
But Strauss wonders about the scope of the Spinozian work of refuting religious 
orthodox and he comes up with a negative answer, orthodoxy is not at all rejected, and even 
though modern liberalism stands as the political solution (modern) to all human problems, 
it is considered a blasphemy to find a human solution to a Jewish problem. 
On the question of a Jewish State, in 1965 Strauss writes, “the Jewish state will be an 
empty shell without a Jewish culture which has its roots in the Jewish heritage”.29 Strauss 
will therefore remark that, even though the foundation of the State of Israel is the greatest 
event since the beginning of the exile [Galut], this event does not imply the end of the 
exile. There is only one way to give it an end: through the Divine Providence. 
Furthermore, there is Gershom Scholem’s angle, friend of Arendt’s, but who also 
engaged with her in a heated argument on Affaire Eichmann.30 Within this context, it is 
important to mention that Scholem and Strauss kept their friendship until the end, whilst 
with Taubes, he had at first a master-disciple relationship that ended up in enmity. But this 
animosity with Taubes proves to be essential to grasp part of Scholem’s idea on mysticism 
and politics, and to consider his view on the State of Israel and even his quarrel with 
Arendt. In his critical article on Scholem, Taubes will write about a “neutralized 
Messianism”, stating that Scholem is not willing to accept the true price of Messianism.31  
As pointed out by Scholem in an important debate held in 1929, “I absolutely deny that 
Zionism is a messianic movement and that it has the right (if it is not mere empty phrases) 
to employ religious terminology for its own political goals. The redemption of the Jewish 
people, which as a Zionist I desire, is in no way identical with the religious redemption I 
hope for in the future. As a Zionist, I am not willing to meet interrogativeor nostalgic 
politics that comply with a non-political and unmistakably religious sphere, the Apocalypse 
of the end of times.” And adds that, “the Zionist ideal is one thing and the messianic ideal 
another, and the two do not meet except in the pompous phraseology of mass rallies which 
often infuse our youth with a spirit of new Sabbatianism, which must inevitably fail. The 																																																								
28Schmitt Carl, El Leviathan en la teoría del Estado de Thomas Hobbes, trad. Francisco Javier 
Conde, Comares, Granada, 2004, p. 54. 
29Strauss Leo, Liberalismo antiguo y moderno, op. cit. 329. 
30 Arendt Hannah, The Jewish Writings, op. cit., pp. 465-511. 
31 Taubes, Jacob, Del culto a la cultura. op. cit., p. 45. 
Zionist movement has nothing in common with Sabbatianism, and the attempts to instill 
such spirit has already caused serious misfortunes”.32  
As specified by Emmanuel Taub, “ It is Scholem’s desire –regardless of this being true 
or a mere historical-political configuration through his investigations– to emphasize the 
political-national and ethical-universal division of Messianism, as well as the distinction 
between politics and religion, but directly removing the primary characteristic of the 
messianic ideal from the symbolic map”.33 And goes on saying, “we could state that, in 
accordance with Scholem’s logics, it is impossible to build a long-term historical project on 
the foundations of the messianic ideal, because Messianism, in its own essence, will 
destroy it […] So as to preserve the constitution of the modern state, Scholem needs to 
neutralize Messianism, if not, this would be impossible.”34  
We hereby find various common concepts among Strauss, Taubes and Scholem which 
are differently approached by Arendt. While Strauss and Scholem seem to agree on 
separating Messianism from Zionism, Taubes, by asserting the theological aspect of 
politics, seeks to unblock what he calls “neutralization of Messianism” by “dethroning the 
existing order”. Arendt, though open for dialogue, will have a different perspective of the 
debate.  
Throughout her path on the “Jewish question” and the State of Israel, a secular and 
critical position was held by Arendt, differing from her contemporaries mentioned before. 
Regarding this theological-political view (Taubes), “Messianic-neutralized” view 
(Scholem) and conservative esoteric view (Strauss), Arendt urges us to consider a different 
view of the Jewish question in modern times. And even when she goes through various 
stages in relation to her Judaism, she does not relate to these opposing views. However, it is 
paradoxically  the work of Scholem –an eminent scholar on Kabbalah and Hebrew 
mysticisms– that could serve us, in a way, as a hint to one of Arendt’s analysis of Zionism 
and the emergence of the State if Israel. 
As Emmanuel Taub recalls once again, “Sabbatianism was the greatest messianic 
movement with most followers in Judaism after the Temple’s destruction, exile and the Bar 																																																								
32 Scholem Gershom, Hay un misterio en el mundo, trad. Manuel Abella, Trotta, Madrid, 2006, p. 
113. 
33 Taub Emmanuel, “Historia y neutralización: el mesianismo judío de Gershom Scholem”, Eadem 
Utraque Europa, N 14, Jun 2013, p. 131. 
34 Ibidem, p. 134. 
Kokhba revolt”.35 Regarding Sabbatai Zevi, Scholem says, “A people which had suffered 
from all the tribulations which exile and persecution could bring, and which at the same 
time had developed an extremely sensitive consciousness of life actually lived between the 
poles of exile and redemption, needed little to take the final step to Messianism. The 
appearance of Sabbatai Zevi and Nathan of Gaza precipitated this step by liberating the 
latent energies and potentialities which had gradually accumulated during the generations 
immediately preceding them. The eruption of the volcano, when it came, was terrific”.36 
But what is it that Arendt finds relevant in this medieval Jewish Messianism? According 
to Arendt, action is one of politics’ key. And during the two hundred years of Diaspora, 
there were only two attempts to change this situation through action; the first being 
Sabbatianism, the second one, Zionism. Therefore, the “Zevi event” constitutes a key 
chapter to think about the connection among secularization, Judaism and the future 
emergence of the State of Israel. Arendt says that “until Sabbatai Zevi's time [Jews] had 
been able to conduct their communal matters through an imaginary politics: the memory of 
a remote past and the hope for a remote future”.37  
Along these lines, the “Zevi event” catastrophically ended with the Jewish Middle Ages 
and defined the basic attitudes and convictions of the Jewish people for the following two 
centuries. According to Arendt, however, Jewish began to “judge secular events by secular 
criterion and make secular decisions in secular terms”38 as a consequence of the calamitous 
way in which the mystical-political movement ended. 
Anti-Semitism was a powerful weapon, Arendt says, and Jews had to take that weapon 
and use it in their favor.  That is how Zionism was created. It is necessary to go back to the 
topic of “the fall of sacred truths” we mentioned at the beginning of the article. In this case, 
this decline implies that Jews had to take action in the secularization era. 
But being plunged into reality is not the same as being realistic. And so that is what 
Arendt criticizes in relation to the European Jews’ situation before and after the Shoá, in 
general, and the Middle East in particular. Arendt mentions that “the process of 
																																																								
35 Ibidem, p. 118. 
36 Scholem Gershom, Las grandes tendencias de la mística judía,  trad. Beatriz Oberländer, Siruela, 
Madrid, 2000, p. 313. 
37 Arendt Hannah, “The Jewish State”, The Jewish Writings, op. cit., p. 377. 
38 Ibidem, p. 378. 
secularization made Jews even less ‘realistic’ –that is less capable than even before of 
facing and understanding the real situation”.39 There is a lingering interest here that we will 
be found throughout her work, as it is the case of the “ability to judge”.40  
In Arendt’s view,  Zionism is the “ism” the Jews found in the era of secularization, 
another “ism” of the 19th century, but one that, for obvious reasons, will be decisive for the 
Jewish history. In the Jewish case, this search for a new guidance for history translates into 
an entrance to history in a strongly anti-Semite context, which springs from Zionism. It is 
after the rise of Zionism that Jews can become a nation among nations and have their own 
state. It went from messianic hope to secular faith in a modern state as any other.  
She has always highlighted the underlying problem of nationalism in any case, and the 
Jewish was no exception. Therefore, it sounded prophetical when, by 1948, she was already 
stating that “and even if Jews were to win the war, its end would find the unique 
possibilities and the unique of Zionist in Palestine. The land that would come into being 
would be something quite other than the dream of world Jewry, Zionist and non-Zionist. 
The `victorious’ Jews would live surrounded by an entirely hostile Arab population, 
secluded inside ever-threatened borders, absorbed with physical self-defense to a degree 
that would submerge all other interests and activities”.41  
For Arendt, there was a bitter-sweet nature in the emergence of the State of Israel, which 
was shown in her critical thinking. She saw how paradoxical the situation was: in a sense, 
defeat meant completing what Nazism had started (the extermination), but winning, meant 
living surrounded by hostile enemies. What is more, she thought –history would prove her 
right later– that the military triumph was no guarantee of political coexistence in the region. 
Arendt pointed out42 that Hertzl thought in terms of German nationalism, while Lazare 
did so from his French heritage together with the French revolutionary ideals (let us recall 
that in the ‘40s and ‘50s Arendt has not yet entirely “discovered” the American 
Revolution). We should not forget that for this dilemma Arendt was drawn to Lazare’s 
portrait of the “conscious pariahs” where she seams to wants to enlist.43 Within this 																																																								
39 Ibidem. 
40 Cf. Arendt Hannah, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, The Chicago University Press, 
Chicago, 1992. 
41 Arendt Hannah, “To Save the Jewish Homeland”, The Jewish Writings, op. cit., p. 396. 
42 Arendt Hannah, “Herzl and Lazare”, The Jewish Writings, op. cit., p. 338 
43 Arendt Hannah, “The Jew as a Pariah”, The Jewish Writings, op. cit., p. 283. 
framework, Zionism fuels on anti-Semitism, but embarks on the difficult enterprise of 
creating a state in the 20th century, in times of nation-state crisis. And that is actually the 
cross the grand State of Israel has to carry. 
Arendt knew it was not wise to repeat the European mistakes in the Middle East, and for 
that reason she built up her hopes on a federation for the Middle East.44 In light of the small 
states proliferation, Arendt suggested a federation of states, for the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire and decolonization resulted in balkanization. She suggested a federation which 
boosted economic growth and political coexistence in the region, to avoid war among the 
multiple nation-states. In return for peace and cooperation, the State of Israel could donate 
its economic achievements to the region. Another option would be to deny the politics of 
plurality through nationalisms which, in a non-factual way, fueled the war on behalf of a 
miracle that would at once wipe out its respective otherness. As Arendt puts it, “but it 
would be a tragedy if, once this home or this state [the State of Israel] has been established, 
its people continued to depend upon `miracles’ and were unable to accommodate 
themselves to objective necessities, even if these are of a long-term nature”.45 As we 
mentioned before, and Arendt stated in a previous text, secularization is no guarantee of 
realism. Thus the importance of Arendt’s critical thinking in pursuit of a politics of 
plurality. 
 
Arendt’s legacy: critical thinking in dark times 
 
Hannah Arendt is a fundamental philosopher of modern society, embodying a 
permanently evolving critical thinking. This uneasy theorist prioritized thinking at any cost. 
For her, politics is based on the fact of human plurality46 and her condition as a Jew refugee 
pariah is paramount for the understanding of how important plurality and freedom are for 
her in such a relentless world. We are immersed in this modern vacancy and it is 
completely up to us how to handle our potential. 
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As the historian Tony Judt said, “in various essays and later in The Human Condition 
and The Life of the Mind, she argues that evil comes from a simple inability to think”.47 In 
the context of dehumanization, that implies the victory of the Government under modern 
states, society’s complicity to any kind of excluding experience is also explained by the 
non-critical acceptance of a standardized logic in the political, cultural and social spheres. 
One of the traits of non-critical societies is the uncritical acceptance of exclusion as an 
inexorable fatality. Arendt has always tried not to be subjected to general opinion without 
questioning it. 
Modernity itself, through criticism, allows us to take distance and put thinking in the 
service of life. In this sense, Arendt reminds us the power of free action when acting 
politically, regarding the life-saving power of thought. According to Arendt, politics 
involve the construction of factitiousness. She states that, “our political life dwells on the 
assumption that we can produce equality through organization, because man can act in and 
change and build a common world, together with his equals and only with his equals […] 
We are not born equal; we become equals as members of a group on the strength of our 
decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights”.48  
In Arendt, to rethink a politics of plurality involves rethinking her view on the Jewish 
Question and vice versa. Arendt’s writing goes against the flow, she does not concur with 
any mainstream ideology of her time. Neither liberal nor Marxist, critical of both 
Capitalism and Soviet communism, Judaism advocate, and critical, only when required of 
the State of Israel; Arendt is a philosopher of urgent times: her thought becomes a toolbox 
in times of uncertainty. As stated in The Origins of Totalitarianism, “Anti-Semitism (not 
merely the hatred of Jews) and imperialism (not merely conquest), totalitarianism (not 
merely dictatorship) one after the other, one more brutally than the other, have 
demonstrated that human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new 
political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the 
whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by 
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newly defined territorial entities”.49 A New Nomos of the Earth for a plural and collective 
life in a secular time. 
Arendt can only be understood within the context she wrote in. And we cannot take the 
risk of falling into purist contextualism nor into the biographical side of the history of 
ideas. Because Arendt was a political thinker who wanted to think about what was going on 
“between men”, hence the importance of her existential course for putting ideas together. 
Her approach entails an opening to the world, love for the world. In this respect, her ideas 
cannot be detached from the Modern state crisis that ended up expelling her from Europe 
and forcing her to feel as a pariah, as well as her migrant Jewish condition in the 
cosmopolitan United States in an era of nuclear war. 
It is worth mentioning Arendt’s fresh thinking, within all boundaries, for the 
contemporary scene. There is a variety of people who, still today, in a world ravaged by 
religious, ethnical and national wars, resort to her work, accounting for this 
contemporaneity: from Seyla Benhabib to Judith Butler, from Giorgio Agamben to Gayatri 
Spivak, from Andrew Arato to Tony Judt.  
For that reason, Giorgio Agamben, admirer of Arendt’s thinking, will say that “the 
refugee is perhaps the only imaginable figure of the people in our day. At least until the 
process of the dissolution of the nation-state and its sovereignty has come to an end, the 
refugee is the sole category in which it is possible today to perceive the forms and limits of 
a political community to come,”50 in a hopeful remark by the Italian philosopher. In this 
respect, in the depths of secularized modernity, Arendt proposes acceptance to social 
contingency, ability to political action and the power of words. All of these against the 
ghost of State restitution, in the forms of modern Totalitarianism. She writes in times of 
bursting crisis, she writes against all nostalgia of the theological-political ultimates. Arendt 
enlightens our path in times of darkness; a star in the firmament of Modernity’s desert. 
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